What evidence is there about the impact of
district magnitude of electoral areas on women’s
representation? Is there evidence to suggest there is a minimum
district magnitude to (a) achieve proportionality and (b) achieve
equal representation of men and women?
As early work by Matland (1993) explains, ‘contests in single
member districts are by definition zerosum games. Multimember
districts, while fixed-sum games, are not zero-sum games, and this
can affect party officials, candidates, and voters’. The
implication here is that larger, multimember districts provide
greater opportunities to adapt selection and recruitment strategies
in order to address women’s under-representation. The first
years of the NAfW support this in-as-much that the National
Assembly’s regional seats have provided opportunities for
strategic interventions such as zipping to advance women’s
representation. That said, this needs to be weighed against the
gains potential arising from smaller, single member constituencies
and alternative arrangements – such as quotas and twinning.
It should be noted that wider issues such as (but not limited to)
political and social culture and party choice are also
important.
There is mixed evidence in the academic literature on the impact of
district magnitude of electoral areas on women’s
representation. Rule’s study (1987) comparing 23
advanced industrialized democracies found a strong positive
relationship between district magnitude and percent of women
legislators in party list PR countries. In a broadly similar vein,
Engstrom’s (1987) work on female representation in the Irish
Dail found districts with four or five seats were more likely to
have female representatives than districts with only three seats.
However, Karen Beckwith’s (1990, 1992) work on the two
parties in the Italian Chamber of Deputies found no relationship
between district magnitude and proportion of the delegation which
is female. Furthermore, other UK and US research by Welch and
Studlar (1990) and Studlar and Welch (1991) found no significant
relationship between district magnitude and female
representation.
In the case of Japan, Iwanaga (2008, p.113)
found mixed results - concluding: ‘district magnitude
appears to make a difference with respect to the likelihood of
women getting elected to Parliament, but only up to a certain
point'. This work also addressed the issue of a minimum district
magnitude. It concluded: ‘generally, women performed better
in large districts than in small ones. Women frequently did not
gain representation when the district magnitude was below 13
[members] and women did best in the largest district magnitude,
which was a thirty-three member district’.
More recent work by Johnson Myers (2017, p.11) is unequivocal in
underlining the potentially positive impact of district magnitude
on women’s representation: ‘the ability of a PR
electoral system to effectively and fairly translate the votes cast
in an election into seats in the legislative assembly depends to a
large extent on whether there is a large district and party
magnitude; whether it uses a List PR (closed or open list) system;
how candidates are nominated and selected; or whether it
facilitates strategies aimed at including more women in the
legislative assembly’.
Lucardi and Micozzi’s (2020) research is also relevant here. They found a positive effect of district magnitude on female representation, which can be split into a positive effect driven by party magnitude and a negative one channelled by the number of lists getting seats. Here the contingent effects of location/ political context are important. Lucardi and Micozzi’s (2020) study was based on data from Latin American countries. They highlight increasing magnitude (and thus, number of lists) as a negative factor because “as marginal lists are usually headed by men”. Whereas, as noted, in Wales and other European contexts the practice of ‘zipping’ and other methods has often rendered lists as having a positive impact on levels of women’s representation.
A key point emerging from the literature is that district magnitude needs to be seen in the context of other institutional factors (Eto, 2010) – inter alia - the type of electoral system (e.g., presence of/ mode of PR), number and type of constituency and presence of other arrangements (formal and informal) such as twinning and quotas.
What evidence is there on the impact of electoral gender quotas?
How does this interact with district magnitude?
There’s broad literature outlining the positive
impact of electoral gender quotas on women’s representation
(see for example Bacchi, 1996; Krook, 2004, 2009; Dahlerup and
Freidenvall, 2005). In their review of this literature Krook and
Zetterberg (2014, p.6) underline (sometimes overlooked) issues of
intersectionality and the potentially positive link between quotas
and district magnitude: ‘the ethnic quota has in fact
generated growth in women’s political representation in
Singapore over time… the need to implement the ethnic quota
led to an increase in district magnitude, enhancing party
gatekeepers’ willingness to place women in electable slots in
multi-member constituencies – providing a mechanism as to why
proportional representation electoral systems may benefit
women’s chances of being elected, even if gender quotas are
not present’.
On the specific issue of district magnitude and quotas Christensen
and Bardell’s work (2016) suggests that quotas may work
effectively with smaller single-member districts (SMDs). They
conclude: ‘conventional knowledge on the effectiveness of
gender quotas for enhancing women's political participation has, to
date, been unanimous on the superiority of quotas in proportional
representation (PR) systems. Yet this view overlooks the many
possible alternatives to implementing gender quotas in
single-member district (SMD) systems… Drawing on case
examples from Uganda, France, India and elsewhere, we refute the
myth of the incompatibility of quotas in SMDs. Our research
investigates and presents multiple ways in which quotas can be
successfully implemented in SMDs’. These authors conclude:
‘In many contexts, these quota systems may be considered
equally effective as those options available in [multi-member
districts] MMDs. Indeed, all of the reserved seat options (with the
exception of rotating districts and alternate thresholds with no
added parliamentary seats) result in de facto multi-member
districts. In practical terms, it may be more expedient in most
contexts to implement a quota within an existing SMD system, rather
than implementing wholesale systemic change’ (Christensen and
Bardell, 2014, p.25). Stina Larserud and Rita Taphorn’s
(2007) research provides some useful summary points that are
instructive to understanding the fit of electoral systems with
quotas on women’s representation:
· The ‘list PR’ system, in which parties receive seats in direct proportion to their share of the vote, tends to promote female representation most effectively, if combined with quotas targeting the nomination process and applying ‘rank-order rules’. Large districts are more favourable than small districts.
· The ‘district magnitude’ has a direct impact on women’s chances of election: often voters vote more willingly for a man when only one candidate can be elected in a district.
· A large ‘party magnitude’, which determines the number of candidates elected from one party in one electoral district, tends to favour women, especially if they are nominated in favourable positions on the candidate lists.
· Women are also more likely to be elected where a party’s chances of losing seats is greater. Therefore, in systems containing many parties which yield fewer wasted votes, parties seek to attract to a wider range of voters by fielding a variety of candidates, including women in favourable positions.
· It is easier to apply quotas in systems that are party-centred rather than candidate-centred. However, where voters favour women candidates more than parties do, candidate-centred systems are more accessible to women.
References
Bacchi, C. (1996) The Politics of Affirmative Action: ‘Women,’ Equality, and Category Politics. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Baldez, L. (2004) Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in Mexico’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 24, no. 2: 231-258.
Beckwith, K. (1990) District Magnitude and the Nomination and Election of Women to Parliament. College of Wooster Working Paper.
Christensen and Bardell (2014) Gender Quotas in Single-Member District Electoral Systems, RSCAS Working Paper 2014/104 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Global Governance Programme-134,
Christensen, S and Bardell, G (2016) Gender quotas in single-member district electoral systems, Politics, Groups, and Identities, Volume 4, 2, pp. 246-267.
Dahlerup, D. and Freidenvall, L. (2005) Quotas as a ‘Fast Track’ to Equal Representation for Women: Why Scandinavia is No Longer the Model. International Feminist Journal of Politics 7, no. 1: 26-48.
Engstrom, R. (1987) District Magnitude and the Election of Women to the Irish Dail. Electoral Studies 6: 123-32.
Eto, M. (2010) Women and Representation in Japan: the causes of political inequality, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 12, 2, 177-201.
Iwanaga, K. (2008) Women's Political Participation and Representation in Asia: Obstacles and Challenges, Tokyo, NIAS Press
Johnson-Myers, T. (2017) The Mixed Member Proportional System: Providing Greater Representation for Women? Springer Briefs in Political Science, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-44314-0_2
Krook, M. L. (2004) Gender Quotas as a Global Phenomenon: Actors and Strategies in Quota Adoption, European Political Science 3, no. 3, pp. 59-65.
Krook, M. L. (2009) Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide. New York: Oxford University Press.
Krook, M. L. and Zetterberg, P. (2014) Electoral quotas and political representation: Comparative perspectives. International Political Science Review, Vol 35(1) 3–11
Larserud, S. and Taphorn, R. (2007) Designing for Equality: Best-Fit, Medium-Fit & Non-Favourable Combinations of Electoral Systems & Gender Quotas. International IDEA (5 Mar. 2007) ISBN-13: 978-9185391967
Lucardi, A. and Micozzi, J. P. (2020) District Magnitude and Female Representation: Evidence from Argentina and Latin America. American Journal of Political Science. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12575?saml_referrer
Matland, R. (1993) Institutional Variables Affecting Female Representation in National Legislatures: The Case of Norway, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 55, No. 3. pp. 737-755.
Matland, R. and Deborah Dwight Brown (1992) District Magnitude's Effect on Female Representation in U. S. State Legislatures, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 469-492
Rule, W. (1987) Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament in 23 Democracies. Western Political Quarterly 40: 477-98.
Welch, S. and Studlar, D. (1990) Multi-Member Districts and the Representation of Women: Evidence from Britain and the United States. The Journal of Politics 52, pp. 391-412.
February 5, 2022
Prof Paul Chaney
Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research Data and Methods (WISERD)